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INTRODUCTION
The American experiment in representative democracy is rooted in the
fundamental concept that the people speak through the legislative branch. The
United States Supreme Court has held that achieving the objective of “one
person, one vote” necessarily requires that legislative districts in the various
states be substantially equal in population and that the states must provide for
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periodic readjustment of districts.1 The Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention
of 1967–1968 took both this fundamental democratic principle and the directives
provided by the United States Supreme Court and conceived the Legislative
Reapportionment Commission.
This Article explores the history of reapportionment in Pennsylvania,
the concurrent formulation of the explicit standards and implicit protections of
the Commission process, the application of those standards to the 2011–2012
reapportionment, and in the end, why our modern founding fathers got it right.2
I. REAPPORTIONMENT DEFINED
Reapportionment, in this context, is the decennial process of realigning
the 203 legislative and 50 senatorial districts in the Pennsylvania General
Assembly to reflect changes in population.3 It is the physical manifestation of
the democratic principle of “one person, one vote.” It is a vital part of our
republican form of government.
A. Pre-1968 Reapportionment in Pennsylvania
It is important to ground any discussion of legislative apportionment in
Pennsylvania in the appropriate historical context. From the days of the
American Revolution, the size of the legislature and the parameters applicable
to the drawing of districts have changed. The one constant, however, was the
fundamental concept that reapportionment was a legislative prerogative.
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided for a unicameral
legislature4 and established septennial reapportionment (every seven years)
1

These concepts were recently explored by the United States Supreme Court in Evenwel v.
Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016) (citations omitted), which stated that “jurisdictions
must design both congressional and state-legislative districts with equal populations, and
must regularly reapportion districts to prevent malapportionment.”
2
During the 2011-2012 legislative reapportionment, the authors of this Article contributed
significantly to the combined work product of the Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment
Commission and the Amicus filing on behalf of then-Majority Leader Michael Turzai before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. To the extent that such contributions also appear in this
Article, citations to the Commission’s or others’ prior use of these contributions may not be
reflected herein.
3
While it has been offered that “redistricting” is arguably the more technically correct term,
the Pennsylvania Constitution uses the term reapportionment. PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(a)
(“[A] Legislative Reapportionment Commission shall be constituted for the purpose of
reapportioning the Commonwealth.”).
4
“The supreme legislative power shall be vested in a house of representatives of the freemen
of the commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania.” PA. CONST. of 1776, Ch. II § 2.
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based on the number of taxable inhabitants in Philadelphia and each county.5
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 shifted to a bicameral legislature6 and,
as described by Reference Manual No. 6 prepared for the 1967–1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention:
[P]rovisions respecting representation in the lower house were
carried over from the 1776 Constitution. . . . The requirement
that each county should have at least one representative was
also added; this guarantee did not apply to any county that
might be created in the future. . . .
...
The Constitution directed the Legislature to divide the state into
senatorial districts and permitted multi-member districts,
although no district could elect more than four Senators.
Neither the City of Philadelphia nor any county could be
divided in the creation of a [Senatorial] district. . . . A
[Senatorial] district could be composed of two or more counties
if they were adjoining.7
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838 “continued the septennial
reapportionment and redistricting of both houses according to the number of
taxable inhabitants,” although “[t]he provisions for Senatorial apportionment
were changed.”8
5

“The city of Philadelphia and each county of this commonwealth respectively, shall . . . choose
six persons to represent them in general assembly. But as representation in proportion to the
number of taxable inhabitants is the only principle which can at all times secure liberty, and make
the voice of a majority of the people the law of the land; therefore the general assembly shall
cause complete lists of the taxable inhabitants in the city and each county in the commonwealth
respectively, to be taken and returned to them on or before the last meeting of the assembly elected
in the year one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight, who shall appoint a representative to
each, in proportion to the number of taxables in such returns; which representation shall continue
for the next seven years afterwards at the end of which, a new return of the taxable inhabitants
shall be made, and a representation agreeable thereto appointed by the said assembly, and so on
septennially forever.” PA. CONST. of 1776, § 17.
6
“The legislative power of this commonwealth shall be vested in a general assembly, which shall
consist of a senate and house of representatives.” PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, Ch. II § 1.
7
PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE PA. CONSTITUTION 1967–1968, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, REF. MANUAL NO. 6, at 11–12 (1968) (footnotes omitted). See also PA. CONST. of
1790, art. I, §§ 4, 6–7.
8
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supra note 7, at 12. See also PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, §§ 4,
6–7 (requiring an enumeration of the taxable inhabitants for apportionment of Representative and
Senatorial members).
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In 1857, amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution guaranteed each
county with at least 3,500 taxable inhabitants its own representative, stated that
no more than three counties could be joined in a legislative district, and
prohibited the division of any county in the formation of a legislative district.9
With respect to the Senate, the 1857 amendments allowed Philadelphia to be
divided. While outside the City senatorial districts were composed of between
two and four senators, the 1857 amendments limited Philadelphia to single
senatorial districts.10
Significant changes were made in the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1873.11 These included decennial reapportionment after the United States
census,12 use of total population rather than taxable inhabitants as the basis for
districts,13 complex formulas to establish representation,14 and restrictions on
representation from populous counties.15 The proscription on dividing county
borders in the formation of House districts which had been added by amendment in 1857 did not survive into the 1873 constitution.
9

PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 4 (Amendment of 1857).
Id. at § 7 (Amendment of 1857).
11
“At various times and in various publications . . . the [then] present Constitution[] has been referred
to both as the ‘Constitution of 1873’ and/or the ‘Constitution of 1874.’ This ambiguity is explained
by the fact that it was adopted by the Constitutional Convention in 1873, approved by the people in
1873 to become effective January 1, 1874.” PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE PA. CONSTITUTION
1967–1968, CONSTITUTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA, REF. MANUAL NO. 2, at 9, n.1 (1968).
12
“The General Assembly at its first session after the adoption of this Constitution, and
immediately after each United States decennial census, shall apportion the State into
senatorial and representative districts agreeably to the provisions of the two next preceding
sections [of the Constitution].” PA. CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 18.
13
Id. at art. II, §§ 16–17 (using state population to determine representative and senatorial districts).
14
“The members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
counties, on a ratio obtained by dividing the population of the State as ascertained by the most
recent United States census by two hundred. Every county containing less than five ratios shall
have one representative for every full ratio, and an additional representative when the surplus
exceeds half a ratio; but each county shall have at least one representative. Every county
containing five ratios or more shall have one representative for every full ratio. Every city
containing a population equal to a ratio shall elect separately its proportion of the representatives
allotted to the county in which it is located. Every city entitled to more than four representatives,
and every county having over one hundred thousand inhabitants shall be divided into districts of
compact and contiguous territory, each district to elect its proportion of representatives according
to its population, but no district shall elect more than four representatives.” Id. at art. II, § 17. See
id. at art. II, § 16 for the formula for Senatorial districts.
15
PA. CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 16 (limiting senatorial apportionment to no greater than one sixth
of the whole number of senators). See also LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supra note 7, at 12
(describing how the 1873 Constitution changed Philadelphia’s apportionment by “prohibiting any
city or county from having more than one-sixth of the total number of Senators”).
10
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As will be further discussed below, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
often failed to meet the requirement for decennial reapportionment.16
B. State and Federal Jurisprudence in the 1960s
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court stepped into the swirling
waters of reapportionment. The case law began with Baker v. Carr, in which
the United States Supreme Court held that equal protection claims challenging
state reapportionment statutes are justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.17
Shortly after its opinion in Baker v. Carr, the United State Supreme
Court heard a dispute in which a Georgia redistricting plan “employed a system
which in end result weighted rural votes more heavily than urban votes and
weighted some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties.”18
In announcing the United States Supreme Court’s 1963 decision, Justice
Douglas declared “[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration
of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one
person, one vote.”19
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that congressional
districts must be redrawn so that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in
a congressional election is . . . worth as much as another’s.”20 In that same year,
in its landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme Court
held that the boundaries of state legislative districts must be redrawn and that
the “overriding objective must be substantial equality of population
among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately
16

“The blunt fact is that past General Assemblies of Pennsylvania have been derelict in the duty
specifically imposed on them by the Constitution of Pennsylvania in failing to pass
reapportionment acts as required by the express mandate of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”
Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 916 (1952).
See also Costello v. Rice, 153 A.2d 888, 892 (Pa. 1959) (explaining that “[w]hether the legislature
should be disciplined for dereliction in the discharge of the duty laid upon it by Article II, Section
18, of the Constitution, to apportion the State decennially into senatorial and legislative districts,
presents a political and not a justiciable question . . . .”); Butcher v. Rice, 153 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa.
1959) (Bell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (noting “that the last Senatorial Reapportionment
was by Act of May 10, 1921, and that the last Reapportionment for the House of Representatives
was made . . . by Act of July 29, 1953”).
17
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
18
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 368 (1963).
19
Id. at 381.
20
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
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equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.”21 The Reynolds Court
explained: “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”22
During this period in our nation’s history, many state supreme courts
were beginning their own foray into these same waters. Pennsylvania was no
exception. In March 1962, the General Assembly had not yet reapportioned the
Pennsylvania House and Senate under the 1960 decennial census. The House
had been reapportioned following the 1950 decennial census.23 However, the
Senate had not been reapportioned since 1921.24 In Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher
I), a group of voters from the southeast brought an action in equity in the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas to prevent the Secretary of the
Commonwealth from holding legislative elections using the reapportionment
enacted ten and forty years earlier.25 In its decision–issued prior to Baker v.
Carr and Gray v. Sanders–the lower court found that the issues were
justiciable, but “refused to adjudicate them until the Legislature had an
opportunity to enact appropriate legislation at its forthcoming sessions.”26 The
county court retained jurisdiction of the matter.27
The General Assembly responded with the passage of reapportionment
bills for the House and the Senate, and the bills were approved by the Governor
on January 9, 1964, becoming Acts 1 and 2 of that year.28 Immediately
thereafter, the Butcher plaintiffs petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
take jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Special Writ of
Certiorari and held that the House and Senate reapportionment bills enacted in
1964 were unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court’s
21

377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court further
explained, “We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state legislators is
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared
with votes of citizens living on other parts of the State.” Id. at 568.
22
Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
23
Act No. 232, 1953 Pa. Laws 956 (fixing and apportioning the number of representatives).
24
Act No. 217, 1921 Pa. Laws 449. “The lower Court found, and all parties agree that the last
Senatorial Reapportionment was by Act of May 10, 1921, and that the last Reapportionment for
the House of Representatives was made on the basis of the United States decennial census of 1950
by Act of July 29, 1953.” Butcher v. Rice, 153 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 1959) (Bell, J., dissenting).
25
Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher I), 203 A.2d 556, 558 (Pa. 1964) (footnote omitted).
26
Id. (summarizing the disposition of the lower court ruling).
27
Id.
28
Act No. 1, 1963 Pa. Laws 1419 (fixing the number of representatives in the General Assembly
and apportioning the representatives into districts); Act No. 2, 1963 Pa. Laws 1432 (fixing the
number of senators in the General Assembly and apportioning the senators into districts).
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decision in Reynolds v. Sims.29 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that
the legislative elections should nonetheless be held using the districts as
recently enacted; and, the General Assembly should reapportion the House and
Senate for the 1966 elections in a way that would not violate the mandate of
“one-person, one-vote” enunciated in Reynolds.30 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court issued a deadline for the General Assembly to pass new plans by
September 1, 1965.31 The General Assembly was unable to produce new
districts by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s deadline.32
In February 1966, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set about drawing new
districts with the recently enunciated standards provided by the United States
Supreme Court in the line of cases that included Baker, Reynolds33 and Westberry.
In Butcher II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed thirty proposed
plans to reapportion the House and Senate.34 But, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ultimately opted for its own plan, which it viewed as “constitutionally
valid and sound.”35 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified “substantial
equality of population among legislative districts” as the primary concern in
redistricting.36 Simultaneously, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “sought to
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions and to create compact districts of
contiguous territory, insofar as these goals could be realized under the circumstances of the population distribution of this Commonwealth.”37
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that the House and Senate
Plans adopted in Butcher II be used in the 1966 primary and general elections.38
All 203 seats in the House of Representatives and all 50 seats in the Senate
would be filled in a single election. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered
29

Butcher I, 203 A.2d at 567.
Id. at 568-69.
31
Id. at 573.
32
Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher II), 216 A.2d 457, 459 (Pa. 1966).
33
In its most recent term, the United States Supreme Court referenced Reynolds when it
clarified that partisan-gerrymandering Equal Protection claims are “‘individual and personal
in nature,’” and thus only plaintiffs that feel the vote dilution as an individual in their district,
rather than on a statewide basis, have standing to sue. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1920
(2018) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561 (1964)). See also Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S.Ct.
1942, 1944 (2018) (holding that a delay of “six years, and three general elections” before
seeking a preliminary injunction does not make a showing of irreparable harm). While Gill
and Benisek are included here to provide the current state of the law regarding partisan
gerrymandering claims, they are of no moment to the subject matter of this article.
34
Butcher II, 216 A.2d at 457.
35
Id. at 459.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
30
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that “senators representing odd numbered senatorial districts shall be elected
to serve a two year term and senators representing even number (sic) senatorial
districts shall be elected to serve for a constitutional four year term.”39
These court decisions set the stage for major changes in how
Pennsylvania determined new legislative and senatorial districts as well as the
guideposts for drawing those district lines. These changes would occur at
Pennsylvania’s 1967–1968 Constitutional Convention.
C. 1967–1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention
The two current sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution that govern
reapportionment of state legislative and senatorial districts were a product of the
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, which took place in 1967 and 1968.
Article II, Section 16,40 provides express standards for the redrawing of district
lines. Article II, Section 17,41 contains numerous procedural requirements as
well as additional standards implicit in the nonpartisan political mechanism that
was adopted.42 Endorsed by the people of Pennsylvania at the ballot box on April
23, 1968, the development of these two interrelated sections at the convention is
further explored in parts II and III below.
II. THE EXPLICIT REAPPORTIONMENT STANDARDS IN ARTICLE II § 16
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
A. Equality of Population
Article II, § 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution specifically provides that,
when reapportioning the Commonwealth, it “shall be divided into 50 senatorial
and 203 representative districts . . . as nearly equal in population as practicable.”43
39

Id.
The Commonwealth’s legislative districts are divided “into 50 senatorial and 203 representative districts, which shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in
population as practicable. Each senatorial district shall elect one Senator, and each representative
district one Representative. Unless absolutely necessary no county, city, incorporated town,
borough, township or ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial or representative
district.” PA. CONST. art II, § 16.
41
PA. CONST. art II, § 17 (outlining the composition of a Legislative Reapportionment
Commission, providing a cause of action for aggrieved persons, and setting the timeline for a
reapportionment plan, inter alia).
42
Since the convention, Section 17 has been amended to clarify the timeline in relation to the
decennial census (in 1981) and to provide for a new election in any senatorial district that is moved
mid-term so that it no longer contains the residence of the sitting Senator (in 2001). PA. CONST.,
art. II, § 17 (amended 1981, 2001). Neither change is particularly relevant to this discussion.
43
PA. CONST. art II, § 16.
40
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Population equality has to be the lodestar of reapportionment. If not for
the overriding need for population equality and resulting equality of representation in the General Assembly, there would be no obligation to go through
the effort and the Commonwealth could have continued operating under
Article II, § 17 of the Constitution of 1873.44
In contrast to the current approach, the 1873 language had established a
ratio system which guaranteed each county at least one representative. As noted
by Delegate Michael in her remarks at Pennsylvania’s most recent Constitutional
Convention, “Back in 1964, before the Supreme Court ruled the one-man onevote apportionment,” the House District from Forest County had approximately
4,500 people.45 This contrasted with 80,000 people in other districts.46
As noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1972, 1981, 1992 and
2002, the controlling consideration in the apportionment of legislative seats is
substantial equality of population, that is, districts “as nearly equal in population
as practicable.”47 Regardless of the admonition in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s 2012 opinion that the “overriding objective” of equality of population
“does not require that reapportionment plans pursue the narrowest possible
deviation,”48 population equality was, is, and must continue to be the raison
d’etre of reapportionment.
B. Compactness and Contiguity
Section 16 also requires that districts “shall be composed of compact and
contiguous territory.”49 In Specter (concerning the 1971 reapportionment), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there is a certain degree of unavoidable
44

PA. CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 17.
Statement of Del. Michael, in 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 457 (1968). Del. Mildred Michael (R) from York County
taught speech debate and English at the University of Pittsburgh. Section 5 Constitutional
Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 12 (1968).
46
DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra
note 45, at 457 (remarks of Del. Fagan) (noting that there were “nearly 80,000 voters for each
Representative in Clearfield, Armstrong, Centre, Dauphin and Indiana Counties”).
47
Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 989, 993 (Pa. 2002); In re 1991
Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 609 A.2d 132, 136–37 (Pa. 1992); In re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa. 1981); Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d
15, 18 (Pa. 1972). But see Holt v. 2011 Legis. Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 759
(Pa. 2012) (“Contrary to the suggestion of the Court in In re 1991 Plan, Article II, Section 16 by its
terms does not ‘require that the overriding objective of reapportionment is equality of population.’”).
48
Holt I, 38 A.3d at 760.
49
PA. CONST., art. II, § 16.
45

Vol. 4:3]

The Protection is in the Process

363

non-compactness in any apportionment scheme because: (1) the population
density of the state is quite uneven, so attempts to achieve the overriding
objective of substantial equality of population will usually require the drawing
of districts that are not models of geometric compactness; and (2) attempts to
maintain the integrity of the boundaries of political subdivisions will add another
increment of unavoidable non-compactness, since a great many subdivisions in
the Commonwealth have a geographic shape which falls far short of ideal
mathematical compactness.50
To comply with the requirement of contiguity, a person must be able to
go from any point within the district to any other point within the district
without leaving the district.51
C. Integrity of Political Subdivisions
Finally, Article II, Section 16 goes on to explain that, “[u]nless
absolutely necessary no county, city, incorporated town, borough, township or
ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial or representative district.”52
It is interesting to note that these boundary lines were not held out for special
consideration in the creation of House districts in the 1873 Constitution.53
These explicit standards, however, do not exist in a vacuum. They
operate in tandem with other considerations inherent in the Commission process.
III. THE PROTECTION IS IN THE PROCESS: ARTICLE II § 17
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
Reapportionment of the Commonwealth’s House and Senate districts,
while not traditionally “legislative” in the sense that it requires a bill passed by
both chambers and signed by the Governor, is nevertheless a legislative process.
Failure to appreciate the value of legislative input, and its recognition of
communities and constituency groups across the Commonwealth, is the fatal
conceit of those who would draw maps simply as an abstract mathematical
exercise. These communities and constituency groups are commonly referred to
in reapportionment parlance as communities of interest. Communities of
interest54 include “[s]ocial, cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic interests
50

Specter, 293 A.2d at 18–19.
Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
52
PA. CONST. art. II, § 16.
53
Pennsylvania’s 1873 Constitution prohibited division of wards, boroughs or townships for
Senate districts but not House Districts. See PA. CONST. of 1873 art. II, §§ 16–17.
54
The National Conference of State Legislatures has noted that preservation of communities
of interest is among the generally recognized principles of redistricting. NAT’L CONFERENCE
51
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common to the population of the area” and may be reflected in the cores of
existing districts.55
Any review of Pennsylvania’s reapportionment plans has generally
focused on the explicit constitutional standards found in Article II, § 16 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.56 Equally important are the implicit political questions which are an inherent part of the process of reapportionment established in
Article II, § 17. The drafters of Section 17 had these implicit, nonpartisan
political considerations in mind when they determined the composition of the
Commission would include the majority and minority leaders of both chambers
of the General Assembly. Commission consideration and preservation of communities of interest ensures that implicit communities are not destroyed by explicit,
but invisible and sometimes outdated, municipal boundaries.
Any system of reapportionment must find a way to take all of the
influences and interests, from those focused on limited, provincial concerns to
those of statewide significance, and harness them to positive effect. In other
words, the protection is, and has to be, in the process.
A. Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention
The delegates to the 1967–1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention understood the relationship between the two constitutional provisions.
The Convention considered two proposals related to reapportionment:
•

•

Proposal No. 1 (which would form the basis for Article II, § 16 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution) concerned the number of senatorial and
legislative districts as well as the explicit standards for creating those
districts.57
Proposal No. 2 (which would form the basis for Article II, § 17 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution) concerned the creation of the Legislative
Reapportionment Commission.58

STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Law 2010, at 105–06 (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/
Portals/1/Documents/Redistricting/Redistricting_2010.pdf.
55
Id. at 106, 184 (discussing these same concepts generally). See also Justin Levitt, A Citizen’s
Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 56 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/analysis/a-citizens-guide-to-redistricting.pdf (explaining that many consider
communities of interest to serve one of the main purposes of redistricting: grouping together
people with shared interests and priorities).
56
See supra text accompanying note 40 for the text of PA. CONST. art. II, § 16.
57
1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 385
(Jan. 22, 1968).
58
Id. at 417-18.
OF
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While Proposal No. 1 was generally regarded as more substantive and
Proposal No. 2 generally regarded as more procedural, both contained elements
of the other and formed a cogent whole. One did not, and does not, make sense
without the other.59
This inherent connection even influenced the process whereby the
proposals were considered. On January 25, 1968, the delegates to the convention
overwhelmingly approved a motion to postpone further consideration of
Proposal No. 1 until Proposal No. 2 could be considered. The motion to postpone
was defined as follows:
[U]ntil such time as a Proposal on Method of Apportionment
still in the Committee on Legislative Apportionment has been
reported out of that Committee and has been placed in the same
reading position on the calendar as that of Proposal No. 1.60
On February 7, 1968, Delegate Fagan offered the reasoning of the
committees61 behind Proposal No. 2 (Article II, § 17). As a starting point, he
explained that the legislature was “the appropriate group to make this change
[reapportionment] . . . because of the fact that they are more conversant with
the State and also the legislative and senatorial districts and the method in
which it should be divided in the best interests of the citizens of
Pennsylvania.”62 The delegates who served on the Committee on Legislative
Apportionment understood that the nature of the legislature and its elected
officials was such that legislators knew about the communities of interest
within the Commonwealth as well as the particular legislative district lines
which would best represent those interests.
However, the entire legislature, in the past, had trouble reaching
agreement on a final reapportionment map. Delegate Fagan stated, “because of
the fact that in past considerations by this body [the legislature] they have been
59

See also Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 528 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted) (holding where
two provisions of the State Constitution relate to the same subject matter, they are to be read in
pari materia).
60
DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra
note 45, at 398 (remarks of Del. Fagan). As the co-chair of the Committee on Legislative
Apportionment, id. at 81, Delegate Fagan was particularly suited to speak on these matters.
Delegate Thomas Fagan (D) was President of Teamsters Union Local 249 in Allegheny
County. Section 5 Constitutional Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in id. at 6.
61
Delgate Fagan referred to this group as “the Committee on Method of Apportionment and the
Standing Committee on Legislative Apportionment.” DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra note 45, at 525. Later in the day, Delegate
Baldridge referred to it as the “Subcommittee on Method of Reapportionment.” Id. at 533.
62
Id. at supra note 60 at 525.
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unable to conclude an agreement among themselves . . . the duty was passed
on to the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court.”63 This problem was the impetus
for the creation of a Legislative Reapportionment Commission.
Proposal No. 2 offered a hybrid, intended to take the unique and
important perspective of the legislature and create a smaller body which could
more expeditiously act within the reapportionment timelines.
Under this proposal it establishes a commission. The commission is composed of members of both the House of
Representatives and the leaders in the Senate . . . .
....
[W]e feel that by giving it to this commission that they can
come up with the proper decisions of reapportionment that are
in the best interest of all the citizens of Pennsylvania . . . .
....
We feel that after giving consideration to all the proposals, to
all those who appeared at our public hearings that this concept
we have in this proposal sets forth the best ideas and principles
and will serve the best interests of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.64
In response to an amendment,65 Delegate Baldridge explained that “there are
no people in Pennsylvania who know the legislative or senatorial districts
better than the members” of the House and Senate.66 In that same exchange,
Delegate Goldman67 continued:
I do not believe this plan denies the legislators, the Assembly,
the right to reapportion themselves. The only thing this plan
does is establish who will speak in behalf of these bodies, rather
than have the bodies speak for themselves in toto. I believe the
63

Id.
Id. at 525–26.
65
Delegate Baldridge was responding to the Powell amendment, which failed by a vote of
49 yeas to 86 nays and 28 not voting. Id. at 538–39. Delegate Jerry Powell (R) was a director
at Electronic Data Processing in Bucks County. Section 5 Constitutional Convention
Delegates and Executive Staff, in DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra note 45, at 15.
66
DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra
note 45, at 533. Delegate Robert Baldridge (R) was a lawyer and farmer in Indiana County.
Section 5 Constitutional Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in id. at 1.
67
Delegate Harold Goldman (R) was an attorney in Allegheny County. Id. at 8.
64
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sessions that we have had in the past several years have clearly
indicated that when given such a politically oriented and base
issue as apportionment, the legislature will undoubtedly
become tied up and impossibly deadlocked in this vital task.
I suggest that . . . the basic proposal, Proposal No. 2, be
accepted . . . .68
Later in the day, Delegate Croop69 offered,
It was not with any disrespect [to the legislature] that we
narrowed it down to the two leaders in the House and the two
leaders in the Senate . . . . We merely narrowed it down to save
work. We knew that they would speak for their constituents in
each branch of the government. . . .
....
[T]he legislature does have the knowledge and the know-how
and it was merely that we were narrowing it down.70
Our modern-day founding fathers understood the need to protect
communities even if their geographical reach crossed subdivision borders. The
Commission process ensures that, when reapportionment occurs, a myopic
focus on boundary lines does not lose the forest for the trees.
B. Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Time and again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized
reapportionment both as a legislative prerogative and as a means of preserving
interests which may not be readily apparent from reading a map or computer
printout. Before the creation of the first Commission, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he task of reapportionment is not only the
responsibility of the Legislature, it is also a function which can be best
accomplished by that elected branch of government.”71

68

DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra
note 45, at 536.
69
Delegate Frank Croop (R) was an insurance agent and broker in Columbia County. Section
5 Constitutional Convention Delegates and Executive Staff, in id. at 5.
70
DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra
note 45, at 541.
71
Butcher v. Bloom (Butcher I), 203 A.2d 556, 569 (Pa. 1964).
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The unique advantages of the Commission, as a legislative process,
were noted in the first Pennsylvania Supreme Court case considering the work
of a Legislative Reapportionment Commission. In Commonwealth ex rel.
Specter v. Levin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered the following
description of the new method:
Prior to 1968 reapportionment of the Pennsylvania Legislature
was effected by act of the General Assembly. . . .
....
The advantages of assignment (sic) the responsibility for
reapportioning the Legislature to such a commission are quite
obvious, and several other states have recently adopted or
considered proposals for similar commissions. The equal
representation on the Commission provided to the majority and
minority members of each house precludes the reapportionment
process from being unfairly dominated by the party in power at
the moment of apportionment. In addition, the provision for a
chairman who can act as a “tie-breaker” eliminates the
possibility of a legislative deadlock on reapportionment such as
the one that occurred in the Legislature of this Commonwealth
in 1965 and compelled this Court to undertake the task of
reapportionment. At the same time the Legislature’s expertise
in reapportionment matters is essentially retained.72
In 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
The principle that reapportionment is a legislative function is
evident from the plain language of this state’s Constitution.
Article II, Section 17(d) directs not only that the Legislative
Reapportionment Commission file a reapportionment plan but
also that, in the event a final plan is determined by this Court to
be invalid, the plan be remanded to the Commission for a
second attempt at reapportionment.73
In 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Albert v. 2001
Legislative Reapportionment Commission reiterated the same themes which
influenced the Convention:
72
73

Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 17, 17–18 (Pa. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
In re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa. 1981).
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The legislative process envisioned by the Pennsylvania
Constitution is particularly suited to the considerations of
community interests that appellants claimed were overlooked.
See Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556, 569 (1964)
(“The composition of the Legislature, the knowledge which its
members from every part of the state bring to its deliberations,
its techniques for gathering information, and other factors
inherent in the legislative process, make it the most appropriate
body for the drawing of lines dividing the state into senatorial
and representative districts.”).74
In fact, the Albert court went so far regarding the Commission’s
invaluable expertise on these points as to discount claims by appellants based
on the same concepts.75
In Holt I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: “It is true, of course,
that redistricting has an inevitably legislative, and therefore an inevitably
political, element . . . .”76
Quoting the Holt I opinion and hearkening back to even earlier
precedent, the Holt II court noted that the constitution “vests discretion in the
judgment of the commissioner members, and it does so with a deliberate scheme
where four of the five commissioners are the party leaders so as to, inter alia,
‘essentially retain[]’ ‘the Legislature’s expertise in reapportionment matters.’”77
The Holt I court juxtaposed this “political” element with a discussion
of the conceptual appeal of a homogenous district “in order to facilitate the
functioning of a representative form of government” as discussed in the brief
of a pro se appellant.78 The reality, however, is that this “political” element
often serves to foster homogeneity and communities of interest in circumstances where the municipal lines may not further those purposes.
The Holt I court cited with approval a discussion of communities of
interest by Dean Gormley. While Gormley offers some words of caution against
the misuse of the “communities of interest” label, he also recognizes it as a useful
and legitimate redistricting tool. He states that “[t]he fundamental districting
principles that the [U.S. Supreme] Court has deemed legitimate over the years
include, but are not limited to, ‘compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
74

Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 989, 999–1000 (Pa. 2002).
See id. at 999.
76
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 745 (Pa. 2012).
77
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt II), 67 A.3d 1211, 1240 (Pa.
2013) (quoting Holt I, 38 A.3d at 745).
78
Holt I, 38 A.3d at 745 (citation omitted).
75
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subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests . . . .’”79 As
one of the more extensive uses of quoted material in the Holt I opinion, the
Gormley explanation continued:
Historically, reapportionment bodies have considered “communities of interest” as one legitimate factor in drawing fair and
politically sensitive districts. A redistricting body need not draw
rigid squares of equal population; in fact, few states do so.
Rather, redistricting bodies traditionally take into account a host
of intangible communities, seeking to give them, where practicable, a voice in the government without unduly fracturing that
voice. Thus, school districts, religious communities, ethnic
communities, geographic communities which share common
bonds due to locations of rivers, mountains and highways, and a
host of other “communities of interest” are routinely considered
by districting bodies in order to construct fair and effective maps.
Shared racial background, along with political affiliation, ethnic
identity, religious affiliation, occupational background, all can
converge to create bona fide communities of interest, to the
extent that the redistricting body makes an honest effort to draw
lines around geographically compact groups in order to give
them a voice in the governmental process.
. . . At the same time, states have historically considered a broad
range of such imprecise communities of interest (many of which
are naturally intertwined) in exercising their sound discretion.
They do so to satisfy constituents. They do so to sweep together
a host of generally identifiable interest groups that wish to be
given a unified voice. This is perfectly healthy and permissible.
It is an important aspect of the state’s prerogative, when it comes
to structuring its own form of government. 80
Addressing the concept of communities of interest in Holt II, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court again quoted extensively from Dean Gormley
and provided this observation: “[W]e do not discount that redistricting efforts

79

Id. at 745–46 (emphasis added) (quoting Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and
Reapportionment: When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 735, 779–81 (2002)).
80
Id. at 746 (quoting Gormley, supra note 79, at 779–81 (2002)).
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may properly seek to preserve communities of interest which may not dovetail
precisely with the static lines of political subdivisions.”81
Pennsylvania courts have recognized communities of interest as a
legitimate consideration in reapportionment, and further, have recognized the
legislature’s role in identifying those communities. The communities of
interest contemplated by prior reapportionment efforts are reflected in the
continuation of the cores of many legislative districts, whether as “historically
unified subdivisions” or historically unified ethnic or religious neighborhoods
which straddle the unseen civic borders separating neighbor from neighbor.82
C. Explicit Municipalities and Implicit Communities
Communities of interest are often the building block of neighborhoods.
Certain communities enjoy specific protection under federal law in spite of any
municipal boundaries which might divide them. For example, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973) offers protection for communities
defined by race, color or minority language status.83 As explained in the
context of the Voting Rights Act, the geographic compactness of a
“community” is not limited by municipal boundaries. Shared values, interests
and other important connections, rather than municipalities, are the focus.
A municipality is a political construct which may, or may not, accurately reflect the communities of interest within it. It can be argued that the
larger the municipality, the more divergent the interests. Even within
municipalities of relatively small population, however, there may be interests
which more closely align with neighbors just across a township border than
81

Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1241. This contrasts sharply with the Holt II court’s rejection of Commission
arguments which were based on respect for the democratic process found in recognition of
continuity of representation and the cores of existing districts. Id. at 1234-37.
82
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania casts aspersions on Holt II’s respect for communities of interest. See League of Women
Voters of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania, 178 A.3d 737, 775 (Pa. 2018). There, the Court held that
the 2011 congressional redistricting plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Free and Equal
Elections Clause by drawing districts that did not properly weigh criteria like equal population,
compactness and contiguousness against protecting communities of interest. Id. at 790–800, 818.
The practical import of the case is to read the traditional districting criteria laid out expressly for
only state apportionment in the Pennsylvania Constitution into Commonwealth constitutional
jurisprudence regarding congressional redistricting. Compare League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d
at 818 (requiring “equally populous, compact, and contiguous districts which divide political
subdivisions only as necessary to ensure equal population”), with PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (stating
that each district “shall be composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in
population as practicable”). Still, League is of limited prospective value in the state redistricting
context because it concerns congressional redistricting and provides little in the way of actual
guidance to legislative map-drawers.
83
Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
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with those located miles away but still within the far-flung geographic reach of
the municipal boundary.
The consideration of municipal borders is important, as noted by its
inclusion in the explicit standards of Article II, § 16. The consideration of
communities of interest, often as reflected in existing districts, deserves
acknowledgment as an implicit and integral part of the process under § 17.
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may take issue with this notion,
consideration of communities of interest does not appear in § 16’s enumerated
list precisely because it is inherent in the process of § 17. They are two halves
which make a whole in the same manner that Sections 16 and 17 work together
to provide a complete framework for drawing new legislative districts every
ten years. The process protects the interests of the people.
D. The Importance of the Chair
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides a process by which the four
legislative members of the Commission select the fifth member who “shall
serve as chairman of the commission.”84 If the legislative members are unable
to agree on a fifth member, “a majority of the entire membership of the
Supreme Court . . . shall appoint the chairman.”85 During the 1967–68
Constitutional Convention, the delegates appeared to recognize how important
the fifth member of the Commission would be to the process. In defense of the
proposal, Delegate Prendergast86 argued:
Under this plan we have the majority leader and minority leader
in both Houses, plus the fifth member to be selected by them. I
cannot believe that they will not get together and select a fifth
member as chairman—a nonpolitical person—within 45 days.
If necessary, of course, it does go to the Supreme Court and this
is a check-and-balance sort of thing.87
Delegate Croop argued in favor of the Commission process and stated,
“[w]e thought they stood a better chance—with their fifth man as a chair84

PA. CONST. art II, § 17(b).
Id.
86
Delegate James Prendergast (D) from Northampton County served in the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives from 1959 to 1978. See James F. Prendergast, PA. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/BiosHistory/MemBio.cfm?ID
=657&body=H [https://perma.cc/PFB7-SPYH] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
87
DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, supra
note 45, at 535 (1968) (emphasis added).
85
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man—of reaching a conclusion than to put the entire body up.”88 And, as earlier
stated in this Article, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the importance
of the chair in Specter as follows: “[T]he provision for a chairman who can act as
a ‘tie-breaker’ eliminates the possibility of a legislative dead-lock on reapportionment such as the one that occurred in the Legislature of this Commonwealth
in 1965 and compelled this Court to undertake the task of reapportionment.”89
Over the course of the Pennsylvania Reapportionment Commission’s
50-year history, there have been five distinguished individuals who have filled
the role of Commission Chair.90 Each of them accomplished attorneys in their
own right, two of whom were well-regarded jurists and two others skilled
academicians from one of Pennsylvania’s most prestigious law schools. One
was appointed by the legislative members of the Commission. In the other four
instances, the Chair was appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Regardless of the means of appointment, though, the Chair fills a vital
role on the Commission. The Chair is more than a tie-breaking vote. In practice,
the Chair is the arbiter of disputes; the director of all Commission-related
traffic (such as meeting schedules between the leaders of the two chambers of
the General Assembly, as well as when and where Commission hearings take
place); and, the moderator of partisan ambition.
Critics of Pennsylvania’s commission process argue that it benefits the
party that holds the Majority in the House and Senate. However, the Specter
Court (above) correctly pointed out that the two Majority and two Minority
leaders are on exactly equal footing during the commission process.91 The
legislative commission members bring an expertise in such things as
geography and communities of interest to the redistricting process. The Chair,
88

Id. at 540–41 (emphasis added).
Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. 1972).
90
The 1971 Commission Chair, selected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was Professor A.
Leo Levin of the Pennsylvania University School of Law. In 1981, the Commission selected
Pennsylvania University School of Law Dean James O. Freedman. In 1991, after the Commission’s selection for Chair, Pittsburgh University Dean Robert Nordenburg, was subsequently
appointed to a position with the administration, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court selected former
United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania Robert J. Cindrich. In 2001, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed retired Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Frank J.
Montemuro, Jr. Finally, in 2011, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed retired Pennsylvania Superior Court President Judge Emeritus Stephen J. McEwen, Jr. See Legislative
Reapportionment Commission to Hold First Public Meeting on March 23, PA. REDISTRICTING
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Press/ViewArticle.cfm?ID=1006 [https://
perma.cc/4GAU-F72G] (summarizing the prior Commission chairs).
91
Specter, 293 A.2d at 17 (“The equal representation on the Commission provided to the
majority and minority members of each house precludes the reapportionment process from
being unfairly dominated by the party in power at the moment of apportionment.”).
89

374

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2019

who must be devoid of parochial partisan agendas of his or her own, assists the
leaders in navigating the journey.
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT’S 2012 “RECALIBRATION”
It is worthwhile to provide some background regarding how the state
legislative reapportionment process occurred in the wake of the 2010 Census.92
For those unfamiliar with the specifics, the first reapportionment plan (2011
Final Plan, including both the House and Senate Plans), was remanded by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as “contrary to law.”93 The basis for the remand
was primarily focused on the integrity of political subdivisions in the 2011
Final Plan.94
Some commentators who participated in the 2011–2012 reapportionment process consistently exalted municipal or other boundaries over
population equality.95 This seems to miss the point of reapportionment. People
(equality of representation) are more important than dotted lines on a map.
A. The 2011 Final Plan Was Better Than Its Predecessor
The 2011 Final Plan remanded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was constitutionally sound based on 40 years of Pennsylvania Supreme Court
precedent. The 2011 Final Plan was better than the 2001 Final Plan which had
92

An abbreviated timeline of notable events:
• December 12, 2011 - The Legislative Reapportionment Commission filed the 2011
Final Plan.
• January 25, 2012 – After challenges were filed and heard, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court issued a per curiam order declaring the 2011 Final Plan “contrary to law” and
remanding the matter back to the Commission. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
opinion was released on February 3, 2012.
• June 8, 2012 – The Commission adopted the 2012 Final Plan.
• May 8, 2013 – After challenges were filed and heard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the 2012 Final Plan.
A more extensive timeline is available at Legislative Reapportionment Commission Meetings
and Updates, PA. REDISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Commission/Commis
sion.cfm [https://perma.cc/S2DM-82K6] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
93
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 756 (Pa. 2012).
94
Id. at 756–57 (discussing the unnecessary subdivision splits made by the 2011 Final Plan).
95
See Public Hearing of the Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, Volume XIII (May 2,
2012) (see testimony of Representative Greg Vitali, at 547-551, Mayor Leo Scoda, at 568571, Mayor Carolyn Comitta, at 571-575, and Amanda Holt, at 580-587) (copy of transcript
on file with author); Public Hearing of the Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, Volume
XIV, at 666-670 (May 7, 2012) (see testimony of Patty Kim, then Democratic candidate)
(copy of transcript on file with author).
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been upheld by the court in 2002. More specifically, the 2011 (House) Final
Plan had population deviations within the historical range, complied with the
federal Voting Rights Act, contained 14 fewer split municipalities than the
2001 (House) Final Plan, and had more compact districts than those which
passed muster in 2001.
Beyond a mere recitation of the plan’s parameters, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court agreed that the 2011 Final Plan was better than the 2001 effort.
In the court’s February 3, 2012, Holt I opinion, Chief Justice Castille wrote,
“[a]gain, we do not doubt that this Final Plan is an improvement over the 2001
Final Plan.”96 Justice Saylor explained that, “[m]oreover, with regard to the
2011 Final Plan, I agree with the majority that it is an improvement over the
2001 plan . . . which surmounted the challenges raised in the appeals before
this Court.”97 Justice Eakin concluded that “[t]he 2011 plan has fewer problems
than the plan we found constitutional in Albert; it is not unconstitutional under
existing precedent.”98
The 2011 Final Plan was constitutional based on all of the case law
which existed prior to 2011. In Holt I, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decided to invalidate the maps.
In the majority opinion in Holt I, Chief Justice Castille wrote that the
“LRC’s [Commission’s] reliance on prior cases as creating an expectation that its
Final Plan would be found constitutional, is untenable.”99 He further explained
that a “prospective recalibration of certain of our precedents would be salutary
and helpful in this unusual area of law . . . .”100 In fact, he went so far as to explain
“our governing precedent in deciding these appeals has led us to conclude that it
should be recalibrated to allow the LRC more flexibility in formulating plans, and
particularly with respect to population deviation . . . Our prior precedent sounds
in constitutional law; to the extent it is erroneous or unclear, or falls in tension
with intervening developments, this Court has primary responsibility to address
the circumstance.”101
In a footnote, and despite a fairly consistent theme over 40 years of
jurisprudence since the 1967–1968 convention, the Chief Justice noted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not “constrained to closely and blindly reaffirm constitutional interpretations of prior decisions which have proven to be
unworkable or badly reasoned.”102
96

Id. at 755.
Id. at 762 (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted).
98
Id. at 763 (Eakin, J., concurring and dissenting).
99
Id. at 736.
100
Id. at 758.
101
Id. at 759.
102
Id. at 759 n.38.
97
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B. A Little More of This, A Little Less of That
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s pretensions of fundamental
change, and 87 pages of discussion in the majority opinion, Holt I provided no
real standards to guide the then-extant or future Legislative Reapportionment
Commissions. Instead, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered this vague
shift in direction away from population equality:
First, and most simply, we reemphasize the importance
of each of the mandates in Article II, Section 16. Contrary to the
suggestion of the Court in In re 1991 Plan, Article II, Section 16
by its terms does not “require that the overriding objective of
reapportionment is equality of population.” . . . Rather, the
Constitution lists multiple imperatives in redistricting, which
must be balanced. . . .
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to reaffirm the
importance of the multiple commands in Article II, Section 16,
which embrace contiguity, compactness, and the integrity of
political subdivisions, no less than the command to create legislative districts as nearly equal in population as “practicable.”
Although we recognize the difficulty in balancing, we do not
view the first three constitutional requirements as being at war,
or in tension, with the fourth. To be sure, federal law remains,
and that overlay still requires, as Reynolds taught, that equality
of population is the “overriding objective.” But, as later cases
from the High Court have made clear, that overriding objective
does not require that reapportionment plans pursue the narrowest
possible deviation, at the expense of other, legitimate state objectives, such as are reflected in our charter of government . . . .
We trust that our recalibration of the emphasis respecting
population equality to afford greater flexibility in reapportioning
legislative districts by population should create sufficient latitude
that the 2011 LRC, and future such bodies, may avoid many of
the complaints that citizens have raised over the years,
particularly respecting compactness and divisions of political
subdivisions. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, we do not direct a
specific range for the deviation from population equality, or
purport to pre-approve redistricting plans that fall within that
range. Nor do we direct the LRC to develop a reapportionment
plan that tests the outer limits of acceptable deviations.103
103

Id. at 759–61 (citations omitted).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck the map, ordered the Commission to
sacrifice some portion of the democratic principle of representational equality on
the altar of municipal boundary lines104 and told the Commission to try again.
C. Perpetuating Unconstitutional Lines (The Perfect as the Enemy of the
Good, or at Least Better)
Setting aside all of the precedent and accepting that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court wanted to “recalibrate” reapportionment objectives, the appropriate remedy would have been to make the changes prospective. Justice Eakin
captured this concept in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Holt I when he
said, “[w]hile I do not quarrel with the majority’s reordering of constitutional
priorities, I do not find a need to make that reordering retroactive.”105
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had at least two options concerning
prospective application. Under the first option, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court could have simply established new, prospective rules for the 2021
Legislative Reapportionment Commission.
The second option involved allowing the 2012 election to be run on the
new, more constitutional lines of the 2011 Final Plan and directing that a new
plan be created in time for the 2014 elections. This was the process followed by
the federal courts during the challenges to Congressional redistricting in 2002.106
Pennsylvania voters were allowed better district lines while the General Assembly went back to the drawing board.107 This was also the remedy for Pennsylvania
voters in the 1964 state legislative elections. The Holt I opinion recognized:
104

While Holt I also raised questions regarding compactness, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court focused on “three particular Senate districts” and noted that these questions might be
related to the overarching concern with split subdivisions. Id. at 757.
105
Id. at 763 (Eakin, J., concurring and dissenting).
106
See infra text accompanying note 107.
107
These districts were from the line of Vieth cases, which culminated in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Leading up to that decision, the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania issued an order on Feb. 22, 2002, dismissing
plaintiffs’ claims except for the one person-one vote claim. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp.
2d 532, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2002). On April 8, 2002, the Middle District of Pennsylvania determined
that Act 1 (Congressional reapportionment) violated one person-one vote and gave the General
Assembly three weeks to craft a new plan. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (M.D.
Pa. 2002). On April 18, 2002, Governor Schweiker signed Act 34 (replacing Act 1). 25 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 3595.301. “Defendants then petitioned the court to stay its decision regarding Act 1 and
to allow the 2002 congressional elections to proceed under Act 1’s boundaries. Because primary
elections were set to be held on May 21, 2002, the court agreed to stay its decision regarding Act
1 in order to allow the primary election to take place as scheduled. Therefore, Act 34 was not in
operation for the congressional elections that took place in November of 2002.” Vieth v.
Pennsylvania, 241 F.Supp.2d 478, 480 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (emphasis added).

378

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2019

Time constraints precluded the Butcher I Court from fashioning
any remedy with regard to the 1964 plan. The Butcher I Court’s
solution was to direct that the 1964 elections proceed under the
infirm legislation, retain jurisdiction, and direct the General Assembly to correct course and devise a constitutionally valid plan for
the 1966 election cycle no later than September 1, 1965.108
In Holt I, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored both
options. The reluctance of a federal court to intervene in this electoral process
notwithstanding,109 the result of the Holt I Court’s order had a temporary, but
significant, detrimental impact on two distinct components of the Commonwealth’s electorate.
The first portion of the population impacted were those citizens living in
districts that were overpopulated under the old 2001 lines. Use of these old lines
in the 2012 House elections perpetuated a population deviation that was wildly
off-kilter. Under the 2001 lines, House District 24 remained a minus 19.7%
(51,007 population) and House District 134 remained a plus 24.45% (77,873
population). Therefore, the overall deviation in district population using the 2001
House lines with 2010 population numbers was 44.15%. This compares to an
overall deviation in the 2011 (House) Final Plan of 5.97%. The Supreme Court’s
perpetuation of a 44.15% deviation was a far cry from “one person, one vote.”
The second group of citizens directly affected by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision were Hispanics living in new Hispanic majorityminority districts created by the 2011 (House) Final Plan. Pennsylvania is
covered by Section 2 of the Federal Voting Rights Act.110 This federal statute
was enacted to prohibit voting practices which interfered with equal access for
minorities. The two new Hispanic majority-minority districts were delayed
until the 2014 elections and this resulted in a federal lawsuit.111
108

Holt I, 38 A.3d at 744.
“After the Holt I decision was filed, Senator Dominic Pileggi and Representative Michael
Turzai—both members of the LRC by virtue of their positions as majority leaders of their
respective caucuses—filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin this Court’s directive that
existing districts should be used in the 2012 election cycle and until the Court approved a constitutional reapportionment plan. In a February 8, 2011 order, the federal district court denied relief
and concluded that the 2012 elections must proceed under the only existing map, the 2001 Plan.”
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt II), 67 A.3d 1211, 1216 (Pa. 2012).
110
Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
111
Garcia v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 938 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D. Pa.
2013), aff’d, 559 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing the complaint for failure to state a
claim where plaintiffs alleged that under the 2001 Plan populations were malapportioned,
and that Latino voting strength was unconstitutionally diluted).
109
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V. THE 2012 (HOUSE) FINAL PLAN
As a result of the new general direction announced by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the Legislative Reapportionment Commission went back to
the drawing board. The Commission worked to reach agreement on the 2012
Final Plan, which passed constitutional muster on May 8, 2013.112
Under Article II, § 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, both House and
Senate maps are adopted in a single vote as one “reapportionment plan.” The
authors of this Article were, as one would expect, more familiar and involved
with House districts in the 2012 Final Plan. Importantly, there was agreement
on the House districts between the Majority and Minority House Leaders on the
2011 Final Plan, the 2012 Preliminary Plan and the 2012 Final Plan. Therefore,
the focus of the analysis which follows will exclusively be the House
component of the overall reapportionment plan approved by the Court in Holt
II,113 and will be based in large part on the authors’ own observations and
corresponding conclusions. All calculations relating to population are based on
United States Census data.
A. Equality of Population and Seat Movement
From 2000 until 2010, the Commonwealth experienced a population
growth of 3.43%.114 Further, excluding portions of Philadelphia, there had
generally been a significant shift of the population center to the east. The growth
and shift completely reconfigured the population of municipalities across the
Commonwealth and influenced all of the districts in the 2012 (House) Final Plan.
Equality of population can be measured by either the deviation from
the ideal district population or the deviation in population from the least
populous district to the most populous district.115 Painting with a broad brush,
112

Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1242 (holding that the LRC “sufficiently heeded” the court’s ruling in
Holt I and dismissing the appeals).
113
Details of the 2012 (Senate) Final Plan are available at the Commission’s website. Senate
Legislative Interactive District Map, PA. REDISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state.
pa.us/Maps/Senate.cfm [https://perma.cc/4WDM-4U2A] (last accessed Feb. 12, 2019).
114
Pennsylvania’s total population, as reported by the 2010 Census, was 12,702,379. Profile of
General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010 Pennsylvania, U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DE
C_10_DP_DPDP1&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/898V-7EWS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
115
See Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 989, 998–99 (Pa. 2002)
(“The Commission cogently notes that the range of deviation from the ideal population, as well as
the population ratio from the least populous to the most populous district, compares favorably to
those in other plans found to be constitutional by this Court and the United States Supreme Court.”).
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a population deviation of less than 10% in a state legislative reapportionment
plan will generally pass muster under federal constitutional analysis.116
Given a total population of 12,702,379 and 203 House Districts, the
target population for a legislative district in the 2011–2012 reapportionment
was 62,573. Assuming an 8% deviation, 4% above and 4% below the target,
the upper population number would be 65,076 and the lower population
number would be 60,070.
Population equality could not have been achieved, however, without
the movement of legislative seats from areas of population loss to areas of
population growth. In this case, the movement of House seats in the 2012
(House) Final Plan was driven by both population and the request of the House
Democratic Leader to change seat movement from that endorsed by the 2011
(House) Final Plan. It is noteworthy that seat movement was not one of the
issues which arose in the Holt I Opinion.
In order to provide context to this discussion, below is a table which
illustrates the population change from 2000 to 2010 in Republican House
districts versus Democratic House districts.
Categories

Population Change 2000 – 2010

All Republican House Districts
(statewide)
All Democratic House Districts
(statewide)

Gain of 463,340
Loss of 42,015

The population change in all Democratic Districts (statewide) in the 10
years preceding the 2011–2012 reapportionment had been a loss of 42,015.
Under the 2011 (House) Preliminary Plan approved by the Commission, two
Democratic seats were moving to two Democratic areas. After public input and
comment, and with the endorsement of the House Democratic Leader, the
2011(House) Final Plan moved a third Democratic seat to a Democratic area.
116

The U.S. Supreme Court has described a population deviation of 10% or less as meeting
“prima facie constitutional validity;” however, this presumption is rebuttable with evidence
that the deviation did not result from traditional redistricting criteria but from a systematic
effort to underpopulate certain types of districts for partisan advantage. See Larios v. Cox,
300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341–42 (N.D. Ga. 2004), summarily aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); see
also Harris v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (“[T]hose
attacking a state-approved plan must show that it is more probable than not that a deviation
of less than 10% reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors rather
than the ‘legitimate considerations’ to which we have referred in Reynolds and later cases.”).
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In the 2011 (House) Final Plan:
• District 22, a Democratic district in Allegheny County, was moved to
a Democratic area in Lehigh County.
• District 45, a Democratic district in Allegheny County, was moved to
a Democratic area in Chester County.
• District 115, a Democratic district from Lackawanna and Wayne
Counties, was moved to a Democratic area in Monroe County.
The population change in all Republican Districts (statewide) in the 10
years preceding the 2011–2012 reapportionment had been a gain of 463,340.
Nevertheless, under the 2011 (House) Final Plan, two Republican seats were
moving to two Republican areas. Republicans were relocating two of the five
seats which were moving, even though the population gains in the state, in the
aggregate, had been in Republican Districts.
In the 2011 (House) Final Plan:
• District 5, a Republican seat from Crawford and Erie Counties, was
moved to a Republican area in Berks County.
• District 169, a Republican seat from Philadelphia County, was moved
to a Republican Area in York County.
To the casual observer looking solely at the statewide population shift,
moving two Republican seats when the vast majority of population movement
occurred in Democratic areas of the Commonwealth might not seem objectively
fair to Republicans. Seat movement, however, is a product of both geography
and the negotiated commission process. All seat movements in the 2011 (House)
Final Plan were agreed to by both House Leaders.
Moving the 74th District to Chester County (Geography, Population Loss and
Negotiated Agreement):
In the 2012 (House) Final Plan, there was a change in seat movement from
the 2011 (House) Final Plan at the request of the House Democratic Leader. Rather
than move District 45 to Chester County, the Democratic Leader requested the
movement of District 74 to a Democratic area in Chester County. This change
reflected the retirement of Rep. Camille “Bud” George from Clearfield County.
Population numbers drove the decision to move the majority of seats from
the west. The only regions of Pennsylvania to lose overall population in the 10
years preceding the 2010 Census were the Northwest and Southwest. The greatest
loss of population in Western districts117 occurred in districts held by Democrats.
117

Western seats are numbered 1–75, with the exception of seats 13 and 26 (Chester); 18, 29 and 31
(Bucks); 37, 41 and 43 (Lancaster); 47 (York); 53, 61 and 70 (Montgomery); 68 (Bradford/Tioga).
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Population Change 2000 – 2010
Loss of 6,163
Loss of 104,874

The aggregate Western numbers did not tell the whole story. When
considering where the greatest population loss had occurred in the west, it
became clear that the Southwest Democrats had experienced more aggregate
population loss than Northwest Democrats.
Categories
Northwest118 Democratic House
Districts
Southwest119 Democratic House
Districts

Population Change 2000 – 2010
Loss of 7,732
Loss of 97,142

There were 28 Democratic districts in the Southwest and seven
Democratic districts in the Northwest. Five of seven Northwest Democratic
seats lost population. Twenty-six of twenty-eight Southwest Democratic seats
lost population. Therefore, it was also worth considering the loss of population
in Democratic areas attendant to the Southwest.
Democratic districts in the Northwest, but bordering the Southwest,
included Districts 9, 10 and 74. All of these districts lost population over the
10-year period preceding the 2011–2012 reapportionment and ended up well
below the minimum number to maintain an 8% overall deviation. As such, it
was not unreasonable to consider changes to these districts in order to reflect
population loss in Southwest Democratic districts.
Ten of eleven Northwest Republican seats lost population. Six of
sixteen Southwest Republican seats gained population.
Categories
Northwest120 Republican House
Districts
Southwest121 Republican House
Districts
118

Population Change 2000 – 2010
Loss of 16,176
Gain of 10,013

Districts 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 74.
Districts 16, 19 – 25, 27, 32–36, 38, 42, 45, 46, 48–52, 55, 58, 71–73.
120
Districts 4, 5, 6, 8, 17, 63–67, 75.
121
Districts 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, 30, 39, 40, 44, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 69.
119
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The overwhelming loss of population in all Western Pennsylvania
districts (87.5%) occurred in districts held by Southwest Democrats.122 Aggregate Republican losses in the Northwest were slightly higher than Northwest
Democratic losses (8,444 more losses in Republican Districts); therefore, the
Republicans moved a seat from the Northwest. Aggregate Democratic losses in
the Southwest (97,142 total loss) had to be compared to Republican gains in the
Southwest (10,013 total gain). The 2011 (House) Final Plan reflected these
population numbers and moved two Democratic seats from Southwest
Pennsylvania. As noted above, this changed in the 2012 (House) Final Plan.
At the request of the House Democratic Leader, in part as a result of the
announced retirement of Representative George from the 74th District, the 2012
(House) Final Plan moved District 74 to a Democratic area in Chester County.
At the time of the 2011–2012 reapportionment, the 74th lacked sufficient
population for a legislative district.123 This was, therefore, a reasonable compromise to address population loss in this area and others adjacent to it.
Since the change in seat movement was in response to the House Democratic Leader’s request, as well as reflective of population loss in District 74, the
2012 (House) Final Plan minimized movement in Northwest districts with the
obvious exception of District 74. Much of the migration and shift of House
district boundaries to reflect this new seat movement occurred in Southwest
Democrat districts. As part of the negotiated process, House Republicans did
concede to some changes to several Republican districts in the area.
In the end, the 2012 (House) Final Plan had a deviation of 7.88%.124 It
ranged from a minus 3.94% to a plus 3.94%. As the Holt II Court noted, there was
“no population equality challenge” raised against the 2012 (House) Final Plan.125
B. Compactness and Contiguity
As previously discussed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there
is a certain degree of unavoidable non-compactness in any apportionment scheme.
While the Holt I Court cited Specter, it also explained that the “Court
did not sanction abandonment of the compactness constitutional mandate in
favor of a population equality absolute.”126 Therefore, the 2012 (House) Final
122

Total aggregate population loss in western districts was 111,037. Aggregate loss in
districts held by southwestern Democrats was 97,142. 97,142 is 87.5% of 111,037.
123
58,607.
124
District 71 had a population of 65,036 (2,463 over target). District 21 had a population of
60,110 (2,463 under target). See 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT OF THE 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, 27 and n.73 (2014).
125
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt II), 67 A.3d 1211, 1239 (Pa. 2013).
126
Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (Holt I), 38 A.3d 711, 758 (Pa. 2012).
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Plan aimed to improve upon the overall compactness measurements of both
the 2001 (House) Final Plan and the 2011 (House) Final Plan.
The average compactness of the 2001 (House) Final Plan was 25.348%
(.25348) as measured by the Reock Test.127 The average compactness of the
2011 (House) Final Plan, as measured by the Reock Test, improved to 25.407%
(.25407). Finally, the average compactness of the 2012 (House) Final Plan
improved again, as measured by the Reock Test, to 25.866% (.25866).
To comply with the requirement of contiguity, a person must be able to
“go from any point within the district to any other point (within the district)
without leaving the district.”128
Forty-seven municipalities in the Commonwealth had, at the time of
the 2011–2012 reapportionment, precincts which were not physically connected to the rest of the municipality.129 Those 47 municipalities were made up
of 120 total “parcels,” including the main portion of the municipality.
Subtracting the main portion of the municipality (the municipality itself) left
73 of these noncontiguous parcels. They are geographic anomalies, i.e., part of
the municipality but geographically disconnected from it. The creation and/or
continuation of these geographic anomalies are the result of choices by the
affected local governments and their residents.
These geographic anomalies had not caused a concern in prior
reapportionments and were not mentioned in the Holt I opinion. Nevertheless,
there was a concerted effort to eliminate these pre-existing non-contiguities as
much as possible without increasing subdivision splits.
The 2011 (House) Final Plan had eight noncontiguous precincts which
resulted in eight legislative districts with noncontiguous areas. The 2012 (House)
127

[T]he Reock Test . . . first determines the two points on the district’s boundary
that are farthest apart and calculates the area of a circle that would have the line
between these two points as its diameter. The polygon area of the district is then
divided by the area of that circle to produce a ratio between zero (0) and one (1).
The closer the ratio is to one, the more compact the district.

In re Colorado General Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 198 (Colo. 1992) (citing Ernest C. Reock,
Jr., Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J.
POL. SCI. 70 (1961).
“Polygon area” is defined by the Commission as “[t]he sum of the areas of all census units
(tracts and blocks) assigned to each district.” Id. at 198 n.14.
128
Specter v. Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 23 (Pa. 1972) (citing Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1228, 1284 (1966)).
129
This number was reported as 48 in Br. of Amicus Curiae for Michael Turzai as a Member of the
2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission in Support of Respondent 2011
Legislative Reapportionment Commission, n.22, Aug. 20, 2012. Upon further analysis, the actual
number was determined to be 47.
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Final Plan had eight noncontiguous precincts130 which resulted in seven legislative districts131 with noncontiguous areas.
A number of the legislative districts with noncontiguous areas in the
2012 (House) Final Plan did not contain any population. The legislative districts
with noncontiguous areas contained populations including Taylor Township in
Lawrence County, Allentown in Lehigh County, and Lancaster Township and
Mount Joy Township in Lancaster County. The total population in these
noncontiguous precincts was 68 people.132 It is noteworthy that addressing noncontiguity in some of these areas would have created additional municipal splits.
C. Integrity of Political Subdivisions
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that a certain
amount of subdivision fragmentation is unavoidable.133 As explained in the
Albert case, some “fragmentation is inevitable since most political subdivisions
will not have the ‘ideal’ population for a House or Senate district.”134
In Holt I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered both split
subdivisions and “fractures” within those split subdivisions.135 This concept of
“fractures” was roundly and correctly criticized by the Commission as an over
count which artificially inflated the number of splits.136
130

Taylor, Mount Joy Cloverleaf, East Lampeter 8, Lancaster 8, Manheim 17 and 19, West
Brunswick South, Cumru 1, Allentown 17-4 and Birmingham 2.
131
Districts 10, 37, 43, 97, 124, 128 and 156. Note, in the 2011 Final Plan: Districts 30, 99
and 125 had noncontiguous areas, while district 156 did not have noncontiguous areas.
132
The Commission Final Report in 2014 listed the total population of noncontiguous precincts as
45. 2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, supra note 124, at 29-30. But, it seems the Final
Report missed 23 people, including 2 people in block 2015 in Taylor Township, Lawrence County,
and 21 people (10 in block 3017 and 11 in block 2037) in Lancaster Township, Lancaster County.
133
“It should also be noted that under any scheme of reapportionment that aims at substantial
equality of population, a certain amount of subdivision fragmentation is inevitable.” Specter, 293
A.2d at 23. Accord In re 1991 Pa. Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 609 A.2d 132, 138 (Pa.
1992) (noting that apportioning legislative districts requires “a certain degree of unavoidable noncompactness and a certain amount of subdivision fragmentation [that] is inevitable”); In re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 666 (Pa. 1981) (citing Specter, 293 A.2d at 23).
134
Albert, 790 A.2d at 993, citing Specter, 293 A.2d at 23.
135
Holt I, 38 A.3d at 753–54, 755 n.37.
136
See Holt II, 67 A.3d, at 1226. The Legislative Data Processing Center (LDPC) “Total Splits”
calculation is based on the actual number of “splits” within a municipality. Each municipality
across the Commonwealth is represented by at least one legislative district. If a municipality is
represented by one district, there is no split. If a municipality is represented by two districts, there
is one split. Three districts result in two splits, etc. Therefore, when counting “Total Splits” within
any municipality, it is simply the number of legislative districts minus 1 (the original district). The
Holt Appellants, based on the calculations in their brief challenging the 2011 Final Plan, counted
the first (original) district in any municipality as a “split.” Considering the 2011 Plan, LDPC
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Despite improvements over the 2001 Final Plan, the concern expressed
was with the “raw number difference in subdivision splits.”137 While the
Commission was not required to use any alternative proposed plan, the Holt I
Court made clear that the overall numbers on splits needed to be reduced.138
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected “the invitation to set firm parameters” concerning an acceptable number of splits.139
1. Split Subdivisions
To add some perspective to the discussion of splits, it is important to
keep in mind that a number of municipalities and counties have to be split solely
as a product of the math, i.e., they are larger than the maximum size of a legislative district.
Pennsylvania has a total of 2,574 municipalities.140 Within Pennsylvania,
there are seven municipalities that had to be split solely as a product of populacalculated 108 split municipalities and 163 total splits. Adding those together (108 + 163), the
correct total is 271. The Holt Appellants’ calculation of “Total Municipal Splits” for the 2011
Final Plan was 270. Again, they were simply counting the districts, rather than the “splits.” Using
this method of calculation, EVERY municipality in the Commonwealth would have at least one
“split” because every municipality is represented by at least one legislative district.
To reiterate:
• LDPC Total Splits = The number of times a county, municipality or ward is “split”
between legislative districts, e.g., two districts is one “split.”
• Holt Fractures (Total Municipal Splits) = The number of legislative districts among
which a county, municipality or ward is split, e.g., two districts is two “fractures,” one
district is one “fracture.”
The Holt I Court, assuming the Holt Appellants counted correctly, adopted this inflated “Total
Municipal Splits” number and termed it “fractures.” Based on the information submitted at the
Commission hearing on the 2012 Preliminary Plan and the subsequent court challenge, it appears
this method of miscounting may have been discovered and corrected. See Holt II, 67 A.3d, at 1218.
137
Holt I, 38 A.3d, at 753–54.
138
Id. at 754 n.35, 756–57.
139
Id. at 757.
140
2,574 was used for reapportionment purposes because it reflected the manner in which
counties report municipal boundary lines to the Census. Municipalities which cross county borders are reported individually by each county. For example, Cumberland County only reports to
the Census that portion of Shippensburg which is located in the county and does not include the
portion of Shippensburg which is in Franklin County. Therefore, the number of municipalities in
a reapportionment context may be slightly higher than other sources. While the brief submitted
by the Commission in support of the 2011 Final Plan used the number 2,563 (Commission Brief,
p. 11), the Final Report of the Commission used 2,574. Final Report, p. 21. The Pennsylvania
State Data Center listed the number as 2,562 total municipalities. Pennsylvania State Data Center,
Pennsylvania Facts 2014 (Penn State Harrisburg, 2014).
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tion.141 This means that 2,567 municipalities could have been, if considered without
reference to any other municipality, wholly contained within a legislative district.
The 2012 House Final Plan split only 61 of these 2,567 municipalities
(2.37%).142 In other words, of the universe of municipalities that could be kept
whole, only 2.37% were split in the 2012 (House) Final Plan.
Using an 8%143 deviation, 40 of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties (60%) had
to be split solely as a product of population. Many of those had to be split
multiple times. Only 10 of the remaining 27 counties (37%) were split in the
2012 (House) Final Plan. In contrast, the 2011 (House) Final Plan split 12 of
those 27 counties (44%).
The 2012 (House) Final Plan contained only one split county seat other
than those county seats that were split as a result of population, i.e., county seats
that had more population than a legislative district. Pottsville, in Schuylkill
County, remained split. Pottsville was not, however, a historically unified subdivision. It was split in both the 1980 and 2001 reapportionments. Pottsville
Mayor John D.W. Reiley testified at the May 7, 2012, hearing of the Commission
that the city was in favor of remaining split between the 123rd and 125th
Legislative Districts.144 Further, four members of the Pottsville City Council sent
a letter to the Commission explaining that the split between the 123rd and 125th
Legislative Districts “has always worked well for Pottsville” and offered that city
residents were “used to this structure, and like how it works.”145
Ostensibly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the 2011 House
map because of split municipalities. Of the 2,567 municipalities that could be
contained in a singular House seat (7 municipalities had to be split due to
population), 101 were split in the 2011 House map. That is 3.93% of those 2,567
municipalities. By comparison, there were 2,569 municipalities in 2001, 8 of
141

The seven municipalities are: Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Allentown, Erie, Reading, Upper
Darby and Scranton.
142
Sixty-eight split municipalities, but seven of those were split as a result of their
population. See Br. of Amicus Curiae for Michael Turzai, supra note 129, at n.16.
143
Or 7.88%. The smallest county which had to be split due to population was Carbon County
with 65,249 people. The largest county which did not have to be split was Bradford County with
62,622 people.
144
“The city of Pottsville has had a rich history of effective representation from the 123rd and
125th Legislative Districts. In addition to successful bipartisan cooperation, dual representation has benefitted the city of Pottsville and the State of Pennsylvania . . . Promoting
bipartisan and multi-municipal solutions to local problems has proven successful for
Pottsville. Maintaining representation from the 123rd and 125th Districts should continue to
be a model for effective governance.” (see testimony of Mayor Reiley, at 680-83).
145
Letter from Mark Atkinson, Councilman, City of Pottsville, Pennsylvania, to Hon.
Stephen J. McEwen, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n (May 1, 2012)
(on file with author).
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which had to be split due to population, leaving 2,561 municipalities. In the 2001
House map, which was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2002, 114
of those 2,561 municipalities were split, which meant 4.45% of those
municipalities were split. Thus so, there were less percentage splits in 2011 at
3.93% which was overturned than in 2001 at 4.45% which was upheld. Even
presuming the relevance of municipal splits when compared to equality of
population as a factor, the authors contend that neither the 2001 nor the 2011
municipal split percentage was close to being materially violative of any standard.
The 2012 Final House Plan demonstrated improvement over the 2011
Final Plan (which was remanded) and the 2001 Final House Plan (which was
approved) concerning split subdivisions. The numbers are in the table below.146
2001 (House)
Final Plan
Split Wards
140
Split Municipalities 122147
Split Counties
49

2011 (House)
Final Plan
130
108
52

2012 (House)
Final Plan
103
68
50

2. Total Splits
The 2012 (House) Final Plan also demonstrated improvement over the
2011 (House) Final Plan and the 2001 (House) Final Plan concerning ward
total splits, municipal total splits and county total splits. The Legislative Data
Processing Center (LDPC) “Total Splits” calculation is based on the actual
number of “splits” within a municipality. In other words, the “Total Splits”
count is the number of times a ward, municipality or county is “split” between
legislative districts. The numbers are in the table below.148

Ward Total Splits
Municipal Total
Splits
County Total Splits

146

2001 (House)
Final Plan
174
179149

2011 (House)
Final Plan
169
163

2012 (House)
Final Plan
122
115

219

232

221

2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, supra note 124, at 23.
While LDPC reports list this number as 122, the Commission Final Report in 2014 listed
the number as 121. Id.
148
2011 LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT COMM’N, supra note 124, at 23.
149
While LDPC reports list this number as 179, the Commission Final Report filed in 2014
listed the number as 178. Id.
147
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The reduction in splits between the 2011 (House) Final Plan and the
2012 (House) Final Plan was negotiated between the House Republican and
Democratic Leaders. If the effort at crafting a revised reapportionment plan
with bipartisan agreement was to succeed, fundamental fairness in changes had
to be the order of the day. While House Republicans took a greater share of the
burden on split reduction in the 2012 (House) Final Plan as compared to the
agreed-to 2011 (House) Final Plan, it was deemed an acceptable result for a
negotiated product.
In its endorsement of the 2012 Final Plan, the Holt II Court offered:
We agree with the. . . [Commission] that the number of splits,
over and above those numbers which would be inevitable even in
the absence of other constitutional factors, is remarkably small . .
. . Moreover, respecting the point that it may be possible to
produce maps with fewer subdivision splits, that circumstance
alone proves little, since respect for the integrity of political
subdivisions is but one of multiple state constitutional and federal
commands that must be accommodated.150
D. Voting Rights Act
Pennsylvania is covered by Section 2 of the Federal Voting Rights Act.
As determined by the United States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,151
the prerequisites to any challenge to a redistricting plan under Section 2 are:
•
•
•

a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority population,
that is politically cohesive, and
a majority voting bloc which would usually defeat the minoritypreferred candidate if the minority population were fragmented.

In short, a Section 2 question arises if a geographically compact minority
group would consist of 50% or more of the voting age population in a potential
legislative district.153 After the Gingles prongs are satisfied, the court will
152

150

Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1240.
478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986), made applicable to single-member districts by Growe v. Emison,
507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993).
152
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court stated that while no precise rule governs Section 2
compactness, “inquiry should take into account ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining
communities of interest and traditional boundaries.’” League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433 (2006), quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997).
153
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993).
151

390

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2019

consider the totality of the circumstances154 to determine if a violation of the
Voting Rights Act has occurred. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court
recently clarified that a “strong basis in evidence” is necessary to pass strict
scrutiny when a legislature employs race as the predominant factor in drawing a
majority-minority district for Section 2 compliance.155
The 2012 (House) Final Plan observed traditional redistricting princi156
ples and the requirements of the Voting Rights Act to establish: thirteen (13)
Majority-Minority African-American Districts; three (3) Majority-Minority
Hispanic Districts; three (3) Influence Districts with a combined AfricanAmerican and Hispanic voting age population of greater than 50%; and three (3)
African-American Influence Districts.
VI. A WORD ON ALTERNATIVE PLANS
Winston Churchill offered, “the maxim, ‘nothing prevails but perfection,’ may be spelled paralysis.” This observation is both accurate and applicable
to the question of legislative reapportionment. As with Part V, much of the
analysis which follows is based on the authors’ own unpublished analysis.
At the 1967-1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, Delegate
Powell pointed out:
154

The “totality of the circumstances” includes, among other factors, the extent of historical
discrimination in voting and in other areas, and the extent to which minorities have been able to
elect their chosen candidates anyway. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–38, 44–45, 79–80. In the
legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the Senate enumerated
several factors that might be relevant to an evaluation of challenges made under Section 2. These
factors are, “(1) . . . history of racial discrimination; (2) . . . racial vote polarization; (3) . . . (use
of) voting practices or procedures that would increase the opportunity for discrimination; (4)
whether minority group members had been denied access to a candidate slating process; (5) the
extent to which minority group members suffered the effects of discrimination in other areas such
as education, which (affected) . . . the political process; (6) whether political campaigns had been
marked by racial appeals; and (7) the extent to which minority candidates had been elected . . . .”
155
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1497 (2017) (quoting Alabama Legislative Black Caucus
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015)); see also Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) (same as to VRA Section 5 compliance).
156
Historically, the Commission’s methodology has been one in which the commission members
examine the existing boundary lines for House and Senate members to do the following:
Determine the areas in which population has changed over the course of the previous decade;
move legislative seats when required given the changes in population; adjust existing lines to
accommodate population shifts and equalize representation within acceptable deviations; split
municipalities only when absolutely necessary; and, preserve the communities of interest
represented by the cores of existing legislative districts. All of these “guideposts” in the LRC’s
redistricting methodology are commanded by the State and Federal Constitutions or accepted
redistricting practices implicitly authorized in the State Constitution and historical precedent.
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The perfect reapportionment plan is impossible to draft. . . . It
became obvious, upon actually working on an apportionment
plan, that the final result, even in the best plan, will fall far short
of perfection. This will be true regardless of the agency
actually responsible for the drafting of the plan. The greatest
difficulty in drafting a good plan lies in the vast amount of
information necessary for the . . . best possible districts.
The population statistics are readily available, but use of these
figures alone will not provide a good plan. They will not indicate
which wards of cities will best combine with adjoining suburbs.
They will not indicate which . . . areas of adjacent counties have
the greatest community of interest, or which areas within a
county have worked and organized together.
This information is available in only one existing governmental body, the legislature. It is the only body in which the
peculiar and diverse interests and characteristics of every
area of the Commonwealth are represented. It is, therefore,
uniquely able to accumulate the information necessary for
the preparation of a good plan.157
The use of the leaders of the majority and minority in each chamber was
intended to serve both as an opportunity to harness the voices and statewide
expertise of the entire General Assembly and as a check and balance.158 By
forcing the representatives of diverse interests to work together in order to obtain
a majority vote, the Commission system requires compromise.
As noted in the Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on behalf of Commissioner Turzai in August 2012:
157

1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967–1968, at 532
(Feb. 7, 1968) (emphasis added) (providing that although Del. Powell was making this argument
in favor of an amendment which would have allowed the entire legislature an opportunity to
reapportion the Commonwealth and would only default to a Commission if the legislature could
not accomplish the goal in 90 days, the principles he espoused are as applicable to the eventually
adopted Proposal No. 2).
158
See Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1223 (citation omitted) (describing a similar argument offered by the
Commission in its defense of the 2012 Final Plan, “[c]iting to the same historical source, the LRC
further notes the intention behind having partisan leaders from the General Assembly centrally
involved in the reapportionment process: ‘The use of the partisan leaders of each [legislative]
chamber was intended to serve both as an opportunity to harness the voices of all legislators of
both parties through their leaders, and as a check and balance.’”).
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Technology has allowed individuals incredible access to information and the ability to process such information. Anyone with
a computer and the relevant census data can create his or her own
reapportionment plan. In the instant series of cases, numerous
Petitioners produced their own privately created reapportionment
plans. Some of these private plans attempted to reapportion the
entire Commonwealth, while others were limited to localized
challenges. . . . However, unvetted plans created by private
citizens are not necessarily viable alternatives and should not be
treated as such.159
Comparing those plans to a Commission-produced plan is, procedurally speaking, an apples to oranges comparison. The Holt II decision
specifically recognized that such plans, which have not been scrutinized in the
same fashion as a Commission plan, should not be accorded the same value.160
Alternative plans are not produced through the legislative process and do
not require the cooperation and compromise of Commissioners representing
opposing political caucuses.161 These plans do not have the built-in checks and
balances of the democratic process. They are neither subject to the notice and
comment procedures created by the Pennsylvania Constitution, nor are they
subject to the legislative process.162 They are computerized projections created
in a vacuum without reference to the people they affect.163
In this light, it is worth reviewing the efforts of some of the alternatives
to the Commission process and product, both within the recent Pennsylvania
experience and as against a national backdrop.
159

Br. of Amicus Curiae Michael Turzai, supra note 129, at 4.
Holt II, 67 A.3d. at 1230–31.
161
See id. at 1224 (describing a similar argument offered by the Commission defending the 2012
Final Plan, “[w]ith regard to alternative plans presented by various appellants, the LRC complains
that these plans were not subject to public review or comment—they were completely unvetted.”).
162
Those outside the Commission process can, and sometimes do, change plans on a whim
without regard to public input, transparency, hearings or any of the other important
milestones observed by the Commission.
163
As is discussed in detail in the Commission’s defense of the 2012 Final Plan, each alternative
plan appeared to have been created with the drafter’s own self-interested motives in mind. This can
be seen by the fact that each plan drew the drafter’s area in the way most favorable to the drafter.
The Holt plan reunited the township in which she lived while splitting the neighboring municipality.
The Costa plan purported to be politically stronger for Costa appellants. The plans submitted by the
Schiffer, Brown and Sabatina Petitioners did the same. Unlike the Commission, these drafters were
not forced to defend the motives and biases of their plans. Holt II, 67 A.3d. at 1226–29 (discussing
the Commission’s criticism of alternative plans) and at 1231 (“The LRC has engaged aspects of the
various alternate plans, and in the process has made legitimate points in criticism.”).
160
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A. No Perfect Plan
The Holt II Court explained that the Commission “has engaged aspects
of the various alternate plans, and in the process has made legitimate points in
criticism.”164 The lead appeals to the 2011 Final Plan and 2012 Final Plan were
docketed as “Holt.”165 As this was the primary challenge levelled against the
Commission’s plans, it is worth exploring just a few of the ways in which the
Revised Holt Plan166 failed various communities of interest.
As an initial matter, the Revised Holt Plan used a methodology which
completely discarded existing legislative and senatorial districts and started the
process of reapportioning the Commonwealth from scratch. This “etch-a-sketch”
method used in drawing legislative lines discards the communities of interest
which historically shaped, and continue to impact, legislative districts. The
Revised Holt Plan created “Potemkin Villages”167 based on the premise that only
fewer splits of political subdivisions make for a sound reapportionment plan.
By her own admission, Amanda Holt (the initiator of the appeal which
bears her name) set out to develop “an impartial and nonpartisan way to create
districts that met the rules.”168 Therefore, the only considerations when drawing
legislative districts, after removing the split in her own municipality and adding
a split to the neighboring one, were equal representation within acceptable
deviations and a basic understanding of the federal Voting Rights Act. As noted
164

Id. at 1231.
“In the lead appeal docketed at 7 MM 2012 (‘Holt’), the appellants describe themselves as
individual voters, registered Democrats and Republicans, hailing from Allegheny, Chester,
Delaware, Lehigh, and Philadelphia Counties.” Holt I, 38 A.3d at 725. “[A]s with the 2011 Final
Plan litigation, the lead appeal in the instant matter, captioned Holt v. LRC and docketed at 133
MM 2012, was filed by “voters in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who live in the Commonwealth’s wards, municipalities, and counties the [2012 Final Plan] split, often multiple times, to
form Senate and House of Representatives Districts [which the voters claim was] in violation of
Article II, Section 16.” Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1217.
166
Both the Holt I and Holt II opinions explained that the appropriate parameters of any appeal
are tied to that which were available to the Commission. “[W]e will not consider claims that were
not raised before the LRC.” Holt I, 38 A.3d at 733 (citation omitted). “[W]e will not consider
claims that were not raised before the LRC.” Holt II, 67 A.3d at 1216 (citations omitted).
167
An “impressive façade or show designed to hide an undesirable fact or condition” named after
“Gregori Potemkin who supposedly built impressive fake villages along a route Catherine the
Great was to travel.” Potemkin Village, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Potemkin%20village [https://perma.cc/C7QL-MEVQ].
168
Amy McConnell Schaarsmith, Lehigh County woman helped upset proposed state reapportionment map, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/st
ate/2012/02/07/Lehigh-County-woman-helped-upset-proposed-state-reapportionment-map/
stories/201202070356 [https://perma.cc/UN4G-8CV6].
165
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in the Holt II Petition for Review, Holt “created the Revised Holt Plan in essentially the same manner that she created the Holt Plan addressed in the Court’s
prior decision . . .”169
1. How Coal and a River Shaped Two Legislative Districts
Economic activity, and the culture which surrounds economic activity,
often shapes the lives of those in and around it. These factors often create their
own communities of interest. Regional pride and identity are often associated
with specific economic activities.
In one example, the areas which make up both the 2001-2012 and current
th
107 Legislative Districts have focused, in large part, on the coal industry. The
old (2001-2012) 107th contained 146 coal mining operations. The 107th under
the approved 2012 (House) Final Plan contained 148 coal mining operations.
Both figures were derived from comparing the information available at the
Pennsylvania Spatial Data Access website,170 with the geographical boundaries
of the former and current 107th Legislative districts.
Additionally, the culture and identity of the 107th Legislative District
has been, and will continue to be, shaped by this industry. The Anthracite
Heritage Festival of the Arts in Shamokin celebrates the region’s association
with coal. Whether visiting the Mining Museum in Knoebels Amusement
Resort or viewing the remains of the Franklin Furnace, the area’s identity has
been forged by this history.
In contrast, the neighboring 108th Legislative District has historically
been focused on the economic and cultural draw of the Susquehanna River. From
the Sunbury River Festival to the world’s longest inflatable dam at the Shikellamy State Park Marina, the 108th has always been, and continues to be,
associated with the Susquehanna.
Understanding these distinctions, the 2012 (House) Final Plan included
only four coal mining operations in the current 108th Legislative District. In
contrast, the Revised Holt Plan moved the boundaries of the 108th to incorporate
48171 coal mining operations and failed to honor the identity of communities of
interest in this area.
169

Pet. for Review at 14, ¶ 39, Holt II.
Pennsylvania Spatial Data Access (Originator, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection), Coal Mining Operations, PENNSYLVANIA GEOSPATIAL DATA CLEARINGHOUSE (July 2014), https://www.pasda.psu.edu/.
171
In the 2012 (House) Final Plan, 43 of those 48 coal mining operations which the Holt
revised plan would have moved to the 108th continue to reside in the 107th, maintaining the
economic and cultural identity of the 107th.
170

Vol. 4:3]

The Protection is in the Process

395

2. School Districts
The vast majority of legislative districts drawn in the 2012 (House)
Final Plan contained substantial populations of the “old” district (the 2001
Plan) in an effort to maintain a connection based on school districts. While
school districts are not afforded the explicit constitutional protection enjoyed
by counties, cities, incorporated towns, boroughs, townships and wards,172 they
often form the backbone of the communities they serve. Taking the populations
in each school district as they were in the 2001 House Plan and comparing
them to both the Revised Holt Plan and the 2012 (House) Final Plan, the 2012
(House) Final Plan did a substantially better job at maintaining these communities of interest in legislative districts.
In the 2012 (House) Final Plan, only 13 legislative districts had more
than 50% new school district population when compared to the 2001 lines (this
included the 5 legislative districts that were moved due to population changes).
Forty-two legislative districts under the 2012 (House) Final Plan contained
between 25% and 50% new school district population; and the remaining 148
legislative districts contained at least 75% commonality between the school
populations of the old and new districts.
The Revised Holt Plan, however, had 45 legislative districts that
contained at least 50% new school district population. Seventy-one legislative
districts contained between 25% and 50% new school district population when
compared to the 2001 House Plan; and the remaining 87 contained at least 75%
of the existing school district population.
The average percentage of new school population in the 2012 (House)
Final Plan was 18.72% while new school population in the Revised Holt Plan
amounted to 32.83%.
3. Seat Movement
In every redistricting effort since the 1967-1968 Constitutional
Convention, the most disruptive consequence of the process has been the
movement of seats.173 Such movement not only deprives voters of the candidate
of their choice, it also has a regional impact in that there may be fewer
representatives advocating for a particular area of the Commonwealth.
172

See PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (indicating that “[u]nless absolutely necessary no county, city,
incorporated town, borough, township or ward shall be divided in forming either a senatorial
or representative district”).
173
In the 1971 reapportionment, five House seats were moved. Eight House seats were
moved in 1981. In 1991, six House seats were moved. 2001 saw four House seats moved.
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As previously discussed, the process of House seat movement was
negotiated between the Republican and Democratic Leaders of the House.
Except for the purpose of accommodating the change in population over the last
decade, the 2012 (House) Final Plan did not take away the voters’ “candidate of
choice.” Much like the seat movement in the 2011 (House) Final Plan, all seat
movement in the 2012 (House) Final Plan had a direct and substantial
relationship to the losses and gains of population in the Commonwealth.
The Revised Holt Plan moved a substantial number of seats away from
the communities with which they had long been identified. For the purposes of
this analysis, a legislative district was considered “completely moved” if the
“new” district and the “old” district shared no population at all; and, a district
was considered “substantially moved” if there would be less than 30%
common population between the “old” and “new” districts.
Under the Revised Holt Plan, nine legislative districts would have been
completely moved; and, another fifteen seats would have been substantially
moved from the communities with which they have been associated.174
The movement of the legislative seats causes great consternation on the
part of the electorate and the communities that are served by these legislative
districts. For example, multiple news stories were published when one
proposed plan included the movement of the 22nd Legislative District from
Allegheny County to an area with population growth in the Eastern part of the
state.175 Beyond the multitude of news stories, the proposed movement of the
45th Senatorial District in Allegheny and Westmoreland Counties inspired legal
challenges to the 2011 Final Plan by the Senate Minority Leader and (all)
sitting Senate Democrats.176 One can only imagine the voter angst, and the
number of appeals that would have been filed to the 2012 (House) Final Plan,
had the Commission opted for a redistricting model that dislocated twenty-four
House seats from the communities they serve.
B. A Survey of States and the California Citizens Commission
There are four categories of redistricting processes discussed in this
section. They include states in which the legislative branch completes their
state’s redistricting through the traditional legislative process; other states, like
174

The Holt Revised Plan completely moved the following House Districts: 5, 22, 37, 74,
116, 154, 161, 169 and 197; and substantially moved 21, 31, 54, 73, 104, 115, 123, 124, 133,
134, 138, 172, 174, 178 and 191.
175
Tom Barnes, Legislative redistricting map angers Democrats, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2011/11/01/Legislativeredistricting-map-angers-Democrats/stories/201111010256 [https://perma.cc/775X-EGCP].
176
Id.; Br. of Petitioners Senator Jay Costa, et.al, in Support of Petition for Review, Aug. 6, 2012.
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Pennsylvania, that utilize a representative sample of the legislature (or their
proxies) to accomplish this task (commonly referred to as a “hybrid” commission); one state that has adopted an effort to accomplish redistricting via a
“nonpartisan citizens commission”; and, finally, a small group of states which
do not fit within the other three methods of redistricting.
Thirty-five states vest the authority to approve their state legislative
districts in the legislature . . . .177 Six of those states provide for an “advisory”
commission process of some type, where an appointed commission develops a
redistricting plan and presents that plan to the legislature. 178 In these states, the
legislature is vested with the authority to approve or disapprove the plan and
some of these states provide for circumstances under which the legislature can
amend the commission’s work product.179 Two of those states, Connecticut and
Maine require a super-majority vote of the legislature.180 Five of those states
provide for a default alternative (i.e. a “backup” commission process) in
instances where the legislature fails to pass a plan.181
Some sources have difficulty characterizing the Iowa process for
redistricting.182 In Iowa, a non-partisan legislative staff is tasked with drawing
state legislative redistricting plans.183 Given that the work product is internal to
the legislature, voted upon by the members of the Iowa General Assembly and
approved by the Governor, it is most like states in this first category than the
other three described herein.
Eleven states have adopted some form of a “hybrid” commission plan,
similar to Pennsylvania, for redistricting of state house and senate seats. These
177

Those states include: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and
Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 30, 2019), http://www.
brennancenter.org/analysis/who-draws-maps-states-redrawing-congressional-and-state-districtlines [https://perma.cc/9AHC-K6L4]. See also Redistricting Commissions: State Legislative Plans,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 21, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx [https://perma.cc/A46V-ABPT].
178
ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt 3, § 1-A; N.Y. LEGIS. LAW §§ 93-94 (McKinney); 2011 R.I. LAWS Ch.
106, § 1, 2011 R.I. LAWS Ch. 100, § 1; VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 34A, § 1904; VA. Executive Order
No. 31 (2011).
179
Id.
180
CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6a; ME. CONST. art IV, Pt. 3, § 1-A.
181
CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6b; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MISS. CONST., § 254; OKLA. CONST.
art. V, § 11A; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
182
Redistricting Commissions, supra note 177.
183
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 42.2 -42.3.
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states include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.184 For purposes of this review,
a “hybrid model” is one in which the legislative leaders serve on the
commission directly or appoint members to serve on their behalf. The
legislative, or legislatively appointed, commissioners typically make up the
majority of the commission;185 who then appoint one or more additional
members, one of whom typically serves as chair.
Among those that provide for legislatively appointed, non-legislator
commission members, states typically prohibit persons who are public officials
from serving and some states provide that commission members be selected
from varying geographical areas.186 Most states which provide for legislatively
appointed members, however, do not otherwise limit the pool of potential
appointees in any meaningful way. Though vested with the authority to
approve plans, two states require their commissions to submit plans to the
legislature.187 In Washington, a plan may be amended by the legislature if twothirds of each house approves.188 In Montana, the legislature returns its
recommendations to the commission which then produces final maps.189
There are those that may argue that, because the commission members
are non-legislators appointed by legislative leaders, the states of Alaska,
Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Washington should be considered “independent
commissions” akin to California, detailed below.190 For purposes of this
Article, these states are categorized here as using a “hybrid” method because
the appointees arrive at their position by virtue of their party registration and
their selection by a legislative leader. These five states effectively adopted a
“hybrid commission by proxy” method of redistricting.
184

ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 8; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2 § 1; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1; COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 48; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; ME. CONST. art.
IV, Pt. 3, § 1-A; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; OHIO. CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. II,
§ 17; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43.
185
Alaska is included in this group; however, the legislatively appointed commissioners
make up two of the five members (which also includes two gubernatorial appointees and one
for the state’s Chief Justice). ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
186
Arizona’s law, created by ballot initiative in 2000, limits possible appointees from which
legislative leaders could choose 10 Republicans, 10 Democrats and 5 persons not registered
with either party, who are nominated by the state’s commission on appellate court
appointments. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2 § 1.
187
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(4).
188
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7).
189
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(4).
190
Justin Levitt & Jeff Wice, All About Redistricting, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL, http://re
districting.lls.edu/who.php [https://perma.cc/P486-7J2J] (2016).
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Three states are difficult to categorize as using a “hybrid” commission
method for redistricting. In Missouri and New Jersey, the state political parties
appoint members to serve on their redistricting commissions.191 New Jersey’s
commission, for example, consists of ten members appointed from two
political parties.192 If the ten members are unable to certify establishment and
apportionment, then the state Supreme Court Chief Justice appoints an eleventh
member to the Commission.193 In Arkansas, the Governor, Attorney General
and Secretary of State draw legislative districts.194
Finally, in 2008, California adopted a 14-person, “nonpartisan citizens
commission” process. Eight citizens are selected at random from a pool of 20
Democrats, 20 Republicans and 20 electors of other parties.195 Those eight then
select six members from the remaining pool of voters from other parties.196 The
majority and minority leaders of the California House and Senate are
empowered to eliminate two nominees from each of the three pools of
voters.197 In the end, the commission consists of five Democrats, five
Republicans and four electors who are from other parties.198
Proponents of citizens commissions typically point to two basic arguments for states to abandon their current process of redistricting in favor of this
process. First, proponents argue that California’s process ensures against gerrymandering. Second, a citizens commission would establish legislative districts
that would be substantially more competitive than those established under either
the legislative or hybrid method of redistricting. The nation’s only true example
of a citizens commission, however, indicates that neither goal was realized.
The use of a citizens commission in California demonstrates that even
the most nonpartisan process199 is susceptible to undue influence specifically
because such commissions do not have the longstanding, statewide perspective
available to a legislative body such as the Commonwealth’s General Assembly.
An article on ProPublica’s website, entitled “How Democrats Fooled
California’s Redistricting Commission,”200 outlines the problems. Reviewing e191

MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 1–2; 17 V.S.A. § 1904.
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 1.
193
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, ¶ 2.
194
ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
195
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
196
Cal. Gov’t Code § 8252(g).
197
Id. at § 8252(e).
198
Id. at § 8252(e)-(g).
199
The irony of portraying a process as nonpartisan when a commission’s makeup is entirely
dependent upon political affiliation (five Democrats, five Republicans and four others)
should not be lost on the reader.
200
Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting
Commission, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-demo
crats-fooled-californias-redistricting-commission [https://perma.cc/V6SW-9N7D].
192
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mail correspondence and internal memos, as well as interviewing participants in
California’s redistricting process, the article describes a concerted, and
successful, effort by California Democrats to directly influence the work of the
Commission. Several quotes from this article describe this effort:
[I]n 2010, California voters put redistricting in the hands of a
citizens’ commission where decisions would be guided by public
testimony and open debate. . . .
The citizens’ commission had pledged to create districts based
on testimony from the communities themselves, not from parties
or statewide political players. To get around that, Democrats
surreptitiously enlisted local voters, elected officials, labor
unions and community groups to testify in support of
configurations that coincided with the party’s interests.
When they appeared before the commission, those groups
identified themselves as ordinary Californians and did not
disclose their ties to the party. One woman who purported to
represent the Asian community of the San Gabriel Valley was
actually a lobbyist who grew up in rural Idaho, and lives in
Sacramento.
In one instance, party operatives invented a local group to
advocate for the Democrats’ map. . . .201
This resulted in a gerrymandered map which did not reflect population growth
in Republican areas.
As noted by the delegates who participated in the 1967-1968
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, legislators know the communities of
interest all across the state and can apply that knowledge to the redistricting
process. A citizens commission, attempting to acquire that knowledge in a very
short period, is at a substantial disadvantage. As evidenced in California, this
inexperience can be detrimental to the voters and can result in significant and
severe gerrymanders.
As to the question of whether the California citizens commission
created more competitive districts, the answer appears to be, “no.” According
to the nonpartisan, non-profit organization FairVote, the citizen’s commission
in California did result in an “unusually high degree of incumbency turnover
201
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in 2012.”202 Most commentators take note of the 2011 election cycle when
arguing in support of the California model.203 However, FairVote’s analysis
revealed that, beyond displacing certain incumbents in the first election cycle
after the new districts took effect, “the overall competitiveness of the state’s
map has not increased.”204
The organization went on to explain:
In fact, there were exactly as many competitive districts (that is,
districts that voted within 3% of the presidential candidates’
national margins) in 2012 as there were in 2008: 5. There were
also just as many safe districts (which voted at least 10% more
for one candidate than did the nation as a whole) in both
elections.205
While the organization was unable to control for shifting voter
preferences in their study, the data suggests that the “Citizens Redistricting
Commission had no effect on district competitiveness whatsoever. . . .”206
CONCLUSION
The nature of drawing lines, making distinctions or making changes to
the settled order is that someone is always going to be upset with the result.
This truth underlies any effort at reapportionment. There is no perfect answer.
There is no reapportionment plan which, when viewed through the jeweler’s
eye, is not weighed, measured, and found wanting in some way.
202

See Did the California Citizens Redistricting Commission Really Create More Competitive
Districts?, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.fairvote.org/did-the-california-citizensredistricting-commission-really-create-more-competitive-districts [https://perma.cc/EG2C-M
FJ2] (explaining that five incumbents were defeated in the 2012 general election while another
nine members of the general assembly chose not to run).
203
See Steve Westly, Washington Should Follow California’s Lead on Political Reform,
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-west
ly/washington-should-follow-california_b_4269611.html [https://perma.cc/998B-PCYS] (arguing that the rest of the nation should follow California’s lead in its redistricting model); see
also Kim Soffen, Independently Drawn Districts Have Proved to Be More Competitive, NEW
YORK TIMES (July 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/upshot/independently-drawndistricts-have-proved-to-be-more-competitive.html [https://perma.cc/SN3S-JX4G] (comparing
Arizona and California’s redistricting initiatives).
204
Did the California Citizens Redistricting Commission Really Create More Competitive
Districts?, supra note 202.
205
Id.
206
Id.

402

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[May 2019

As noted in the Commission brief and recognized in the Holt II opinion,
the “other” plans which levelled challenges at the 2012 Final Plan were all
subject to legitimate criticism. Each focused on one particular interest or one
particular community, whether it was the self-serving plan put forward by one
Caucus of the General Assembly or the Holt plan motivated by the desire to put
one township back together at the expense of a neighboring municipality. Each
started with the premise of benefitting a particular subset of the Commonwealth.
The Commission, as a democratic institution, has proven time and
again that it is particularly suited to comprehend all of the various communities
of interest across the Commonwealth. In concert with the explicit standards of
Article II, § 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is the Commission process
in § 17 which protects us all.

